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1. Introduction 
Emergent experimental and clinical evidence supports the notion that the cortico-basal 
ganglia–thalamo-cortical loops progress along parallel circuits connecting cortical and 
subcortical regions subserving the processing of sensorimotor information, associative and 
affective knowledge [1]. In particular the role of the basal ganglia has long been known to be 
involved in motor control because of the marked deficits associated with their damage. 
However, the exact aspects of motor control that they have under normal conditions have 
not been clear at all. The traditional view is that the basal ganglia are involved in the 
selection and inhibition of action commands [2], but an increasing number of brain-imaging 
studies show that the basal ganglia, besides being involved in motor tasks are also involved 
in more integrative and cognitive processes such as mental imagery [3,4], sensory 
processing [5,6], planning [7], attention [8,9], and language [6,10,11]. This evidence supports 
the view that the basal ganglia output not only targets the primary sensory-motor cortices, 
but also specific areas of premotor and prefrontal cortex, which include the oculomotor area 
of the cortex, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, lateral orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior 
cingulate/medial orbitofrontal cortices [12]. Thus, having the ability to influence not only 
sensory-motor control, but also several different types of cognitive and limbic affective 
functions [12] which underlie complex and integrative processes such as self-awareness, 
introspective perspective of one’s own self and consciousness [13]. This integrative role 
between lower afferent input and higher integrative and executive stages of information 
processing require an intact and closed loop of information flow to generate the primary 
experience of self and thus self-agency. Self-agency has tentatively been defined as the 
feeling of being the author of one’s own actions [14]. Thus, when we move our arm, we 
know (a) that it is our arm and (b) that it is us, who moves the arm. One approach to 
understand the complex integration of afferent and efferent information processing and the 
integration in the self is the internal model theory of motor control [15]. According to this 
theory there are two functionally different components in the motor system, inverse and 
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forward circuits. It is assumed that inverse models provide the motor commands necessary 
to achieve a desired consequence of an action, specified by higher-level goals (e.g., 
intentions). One is fully aware of the desired consequences of an action, but unaware of the 
motor programs per se. Forward models predict the sensory consequences of each motor 
program to be executed, an idea known as the efference copy, a model first put forward in 
von Holst and Mittelstaedt [16] and which has been extended in recent years with the “null” 
hypothesis of Ramachandran [17]. Accordingly, it is claimed that, whenever a motor 
program is issued, an efference copy is produced in parallel, this is, a prediction of the 
sensory consequences expected after the execution of the program based on exactly this 
efference copy. The internal model theory of motor control has been successfully applied to 
explain a whole variety of disorders related to the awareness of actions [for a review see 17] 
but the role played by the basal ganglia in this model has not been very clear. Here we 
follow this model extending it to the performance of a complex cognitive task, such as 
mental imaginary movement of a limb and the coexistent conscious awareness of just 
imagining it and actually refraining from moving it which involves exactly this subtle 
combination between the forward model requiring intact peripheral efferent/afferent 
information pathways and the inverse model requiring intact higher-level cortical areas 
which include the basal ganglia-thalamus-cortex pathway [19]. Moreover, we contrast the 
normal integrity of this forward/inverse model loop in healthy subjects with an abnormal 
open loop in amputees where an essential part of the loop has been disrupted. We thus 
argue that because of this abnormal and open loop involving the basal ganglia and the 
thalamocortical system the conscious awareness of the phantom phenomenon is created. 
2. Problem statement 
Waking up from anesthesia, an amputee faces the conflict in the experience of self, between 
the conscious vividness of his phantom limb (PL) and the lack of correlation with reality 
[20–23]. In the urge to discover whether he was actually amputated, the patient looks under 
the sheet for visual self-recognition and is, in a flash, confronted with this new reality of an 
absent limb. The resulting cognitive conflict between the seen embodiment and the felt one, 
in most cases carries on resulting in the perception of a ghost of their amputated limb as a 
phantom [24]. Giummarra et al. [20] report phantom limb experiences that include 
phenomena of (a) perception of bodily aspects of phantom limbs such as size (in relation to 
the intact limb), shape, posture, and telescoping (or shortening) of the phantom; (b) 
exteroceptive and proprioceptive sensations and (c) prosthesis embodiment. Early studies of 
phantom limb movement were carried out using combined techniques of EEG, MEG, and 
fMRI in order to locate its representation in the sensory-motor cortex [25–28] and in the 
cerebellum [29,30]. Later studies described the distinct functional anatomy of the mental 
representation of imaginary movements [31], during planning, visualizing, and motor 
intention [32], both in healthy subjects as well as in patients with different neural diseases. 
Other studies have centered on the difference between imaginary movement and executed 
movement [3,33]. A recent study by Diers et al. [34] showed activation in the supplementary 
motor area (SMA) cortex after PL imagined movement. And in a more recent study Pasaye 
et al. [35] have described nuerocorrelates of the PL perception using fMRI. Since the first  
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conceptualization of the phenomenon of phantom limb in amputees in 1915, as the 
manifestation of the persistence of the body schema of the missing limb [36], many theories 
have arisen. Most of these theories suggest a central role of reorganization of the 
somatosensory cortex, others advocate for a perceptual completion [37], or the product of 
conflicting cues from central reorganizational changes [38].  Although some degree of 
sensory or motor impairment is constant, recent models of motor awareness suggest that the 
reduction in afferent information may be less critical than higher-level reorganization related 
to the subjective correlates of action planning and motor intention [15,39]. In contras, a 
number of studies of patients with amputated limbs encourage that a conscious perception 
of a body part by tactile stimulation does not necessarily require the integrity or even 
existence of the tactile receptors on the skin, or the body parts themselves. That is, the neural 
representation of the body in the brain is sufficient to elicit an awareness of the body part or 
tactile stimuli in the absence of its physical counterpart (e.g., the limbs themselves) [40]. We 
believe that the reduction or absence in afferent information is a key factor that in 
combination with higher-level reorganization generates the conscious awareness of the 
phantom phenomenon. Here we hypothesize that for the performance of a complex 
cognitive task, such as imaginary movement of a limb, and the concomitant conscious 
awareness of just imagining it and actually refraining from moving it, an involvement of a 
subtle combination between intact peripheric (efferent/afferent) information pathways and 
intact higher-level cortical areas (basal-ganglia-thalamus-cortex pathway) are needed [19]. 
In amputees, this normal combination of lower- and higher-level processes is disrupted and 
could be the underlying cause of conscious awareness of the phantom limb. This 
arrangement of processes was reported by Staub et al. [41], who found an increased blood 
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal in the Basal Ganglia-Thalamic-Motor-Cortex loop 
pathway during imaginary movement of a patient with chronic supernumerary phantom 
limb, which developed only in association with motor intent directed at a hemiplegic-
anesthetic upper limb. Staub’s finding is analogical to what Ramachandran proposes as the 
“null” signal hypothesis in the mirror neuron system (MNS), which prevents activity in the 
MNS from reaching the threshold for conscious awareness [17] or related to what Fitzgibbon et 
al. [42] suggests as the underlying cause in synesthesia for pain. We think that the logic behind 
Ramachandran’s hypothesis is plausible, and if applied to an intact afferent somatosensory-
proprioceptive and efferent motor feedback, no activity in the basal-ganglia-thalamus-cortex 
loop would be seen in healthy subjects, in contrast to the incomplete closing of the 
afferent/efferent loop and therefore an absence of the “null” signal in the case of amputees. 
Hence the inhibition of activity in the basal ganglia-thalamus-cortex pathway is disrupted, 
thereby generating an abnormal open loop functioning of the thalamocortical system and its 
consequent activation. This abnormal activation of the thalamocortical system, we suggest, 
could be the underlying cause of the conscious awareness of the phantom phenomenon. 
This hypothesis is also in accordance with an emergent change of view in the functionality of 
the basal ganglia, from the classic view of being just part of the common motor pathway, to a 
more integrative, dynamic and resource-selection mechanism that participates in the sensory-
motor, affective, and cognitive process related to the executive planning and selection of an 
action mechanism [43]. Furthermore, the conscious awareness and the subsequent sense of 
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agency [44] which patients report to have had as they perform imagined tasks with their 
amputated limbs has never between contrasted with healthy subjects. 
In the current study, we tested the hypothesis that the basal ganglia-thalamus-cortex 
pathway is disrupted in amputees, as compared to control subjects, and that this disruption 
is the key to the cascade of conscious awareness of the phantom limb. We contrasted 
between lower limb amputees and control subjects as they performed a simulated 
neurocognitive motor-imagery task with their phantom toes or intact toes respectively.  
3. Method used 
3.1. Subjects 
Six unilateral lower limb amputees, 3 with left lower limb (LLL) and 3 with right lower limb 
(RLL) amputation (mean age 35.3, range 15-60 years, for details see Table 1), and 6 healthy 
controls (HC, mean age 29.16, range 20-59 years) participated in the study. All participants 
gave written informed consent prior to taking part in the study and the local institutional 
review board approved the protocol, which adhered to the Declaration of Helsinki. None of 
the subjects had neurological or psychiatric disorders.  
 
 Age1 
Ctrl 
 
Age2 
Pat 
 
Amp3   
side 
Amp4 
site 
Cause of5 
Amputation 
SP6 PLP7 PLS8 
 
1 
20 34& RLL TF Traumatic + - + 
2 21 15 RLL TT Traumatic + - + 
3 22 44 RLL TT Traumatic + - + 
4 24 60 LLL TT Traumatic + - + 
5 29 33 LLL TF Traumatic + - + 
6 59 26 LLL TT Traumatic + - + 
Table 1. Clinical data description of controls and patients. All subjects are right handed males. 1Column 
for control subjects’ age. 2Column for patients’ age. 3Three patients had right lower limb amputation 
and three had left lower limb amputation.4Site of surgery.  5Car or train accident was main cause of 
amputation. 6All the patients reported stump pain (SP), but 7none ever had Phantom Limb Pain (PLP). 
8All patients were able to move at will their phantom toes (extension/flexion).  
3.2. Experimental procedure 
The experiment consisted of two parts. In the ‘executed movement’ condition the participants 
were instructed to make a flexion/extension movement with the intact (amputees) or non-
dominant (HC) toes. In the condition ‘imagined movements’ the amputees imagined making a 
flexion/extension movement with the phantom toes and the HC imagined the same movement 
with their dominant toes. For all conditions the subjects had their eyes open. All movements or 
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imagined movements were observed under close scrutiny by the researcher. All conditions 
were separate blocks of fMRI measurements with durations of 30 seconds each, separated by 
resting periods of 30 seconds. Each condition was repeated three times. There was no training 
session for either the control subjects or the amputees.  
3.3. fMRI measurement 
The fMRI scans were conducted with a GE 1.5 T GE LX Magnetic Resonance instrument 
(Milwaukee, WI, USA) using the standard quadrature headcoil. Subject’s head was securely 
fastened in the head holder to minimize movement. Functional images were acquired with 
GE EPI-BOLD pulse sequence with 90° flip angle TE=60 ms, TR=3000 ms, over seven 
contiguous coronal sections, 8.0 mm thick with zero gap. Imaging was centered near the 
central gyrus. Structural images localized exactly over the same seven sections of the 
functional studies were obtained using a high resolution T1 weighted protocol. The 
activation was done in boxcar block paradigm of 30 seconds of stimulated state and 30 
seconds of un-stimulated state, over a total of three blocks each. 
3.4. Image analysis  
All MR data was transferred to an offline workstation all images were translated into time-
ordered stacks using the software MRIcro (Chris Rorden, http://www.cabiatl.com/mricro/). 
The experiments were analyzed subject by subject following a standard motion correction 
with image registration, to do a more precise alignment, since the study was acquired in 
coronal slices, the high resolution T1-weighted images were aligned to the T1-weighted 
SPM mask in MNI space, the transformations were saved and applied to the functional EPI 
time ordered stacks, and then the functional images were normalized to a ROI of the EPI 
standard provided by SPM, spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 6mm and 
high pass temporal filtering. Functional signal was obtained with a block model convolved 
with an hemodynamic response function (HRF) without time derivative correction these 
single subject analysis resulted in contrast maps used in the second level analysis.  The 
second level analysis was executed to estimate group average activation using a Student–t 
maps limited and adjusted with p = 0.05 with no Volterra interactions. 
4. Results 
Analysis of the data was carried out for each subject individually, to see if there were 
statistically significant activation clusters, and then by group after combining all subjects. 
The average functional maps obtained revealed ipsilateral or contralateral brain activation 
sites, which were colored according to the tasks performed on each lower limb of all 
subjects: green-colored brain activation sites correspond to the right leg, while red-colored 
brain activation sites correspond to the left leg. Yellow-colored sites correspond to areas of 
overlapping activation during the performance of the tasks on each limb. The results of the 
three groups’ brain activation sites are summarized in Table 2. 
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  Talairach coordinates RIGHT  Talairach 
coordinates 
BRAIN REGION BA x y z   BRAIN REGION BA x y z 
     Left amputee,  
executing right 
imaginary motion 
     
Middle Temporal 
Gyrus 
22 -61 -37 6  Middle Temporal 
Gyrus 
21 51 -29 -5 
Paracentral Lobule 4 -10 -38 63       
Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 -6 -14 62       
Precentral Gyrus 6 -30 -20 64       
Lentiform Nucleus, 
Putamen 
* -26 -8 4             
     Left amputee, executing 
left virtual motion 
     
Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 -8 -11 50  Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 2 -26 64 
Sub-Gyral 37 -48 -39 -5  Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 6 -9 61 
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
22 -59 -35 9  Substania Nigra * 8 -24 -14 
Thalamus * -8 -25 1  Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
21 48 -27 -5 
Precentral Gyrus 4 -42 -11 47             
     Right amputee, 
executing left imaginary 
motion 
     
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
22 -65 -42 15  Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
22 50 -4 -1 
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
22 -65 -18 -1  Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
22 50 -12 1 
Postcentral Gyrus 3 -44 -17 54  Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 8 -11 50 
Cingulate Gyrus 24 -8 -10 41  Middle Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 40 -5 46 
      Cingulate Gyrus 24 8 -12 37 
            Thalamus * 18 -9 13 
     Right amputee, 
 executing right virtual 
motion 
     
Precentral Gyrus 4 -12 -32 62  Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
22 51 -4 -3 
Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 -10 -26 58       
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  Talairach coordinates RIGHT  Talairach 
coordinates 
BRAIN REGION BA x y z   BRAIN REGION BA x y z 
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
42 -63 -28 14       
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
* -63 -21 3       
Precentral Gyrus 4 -50 -12 41       
Lentiform Nucleus, 
Medial Globus 
Pallidus 
 -16 -10 -6       
Substania Nigra * -8 -10 -10       
          Control, 
 executing left imaginary 
motion 
          
Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus 
45 -61 20 16  Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 8 -12 71 
            Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 2 -3 61 
     Control, 
 executing right 
imaginary motion 
     
Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 -2 3 51  Postcentral Gyrus 43 65 -16 21 
Superior Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 -8 -6 68       
Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 
6 -8 1 53       
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
22 -50 4 2             
BA=Brodmann Area.        
Talairach coordinates: x (left[-], right[+]); y (posterior[-], anterior[+]), z (inferior[-], 
superior[+]). * no Brodmann area related 
    
Table 2. Anatomical location of activation clusters during imaginary and virtual motion. 
The average functional maps obtained from LLL amputee during the imaginary movement 
of the toes of both feet also present distinct cortical and subcortical activity. Performance of 
imaginary movement of the toes of the right intact toes showed activation sites bilaterally at 
the STG (BA 21,22), contralateral interhemispheric M1 (BA 4), contralateral SMA (BA 6), and 
contralateral Putamen. During the performance of imaginary movement with the left 
amputated toes, distinct cortical and subcortical activities were observed at the following 
sites: bilateral interhemispheric SMA (BA 6), bilateral STG (BA 21,22), ipsilateral M1 (BA 4), 
ipsilateral Subgyral (BA 37), ipsilateral Thalamus, and contralateral Substantia Nigra  
(figure 1,A). 
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Figure 1. Average functional activation maps during imaginary movement of the right leg (in green) 
and left leg (in red) for A) left lower limb amputees, B) right lower limb amputees and C) control 
subjects. All images are presented in radiological convention. 
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Average functional activation maps acquired from RLL amputees during the imaginary 
movement of the toes of both feet depict both cortical and subcortical activities. During the 
performance of imaginary movement of the toes of the left intact toes, there is bilateral 
Temporal activity (BA 22), and bilateral Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC, BA 24), ipsilateral 
Primary Somatosensory Cortex (SI, BA 3), contralateral SMA (BA 6), and contralateral 
Thalamic activity, while during the performance of imaginary movement with the right 
amputed toes, there is a distinct activation, namely of the bilateral STG (BA 42, 22), 
contralateral Primary Motor Cortex (M1, BA 4), contralateral SMA (BA 6), contralateral 
Basal Ganglia at the Medial Globus Pallidus and at the Substantia Nigra (figure 1, B).  
The average functional maps obtained from the six control subjects as they performed 
imaginary movement with (a) the toes of their right leg show activated contralateral sites 
corresponding to interhemispheric Supplementary Motor Area (SMA, BA 6), Superior 
Temporal Gyrus (STG, BA 22), and Ipsilateral Postcentral Gyrus (IPG, BA 43); while the 
performance of the same tasks with (b) the toes of their left leg, activated similar 
contralateral interhemispheric SMA (BA 6) and ipsilateral prefrontal (PF, BA 45) brain areas 
(figure 1,C). 
5. Discussion 
Here we compared the brain activations of imagined and executed movements of the intact 
toes and phantom toes in lower limb amputees, with the imagined and executed movement 
of the toes of healthy controls, using fMRI. Both, patients and control subject expressed that 
they initially had to exert greater effort in this self-generating dual process of 1) trying to 
resolve an apparent conflict between the simultaneous intent to move their toes and 
refraining from moving them or closing the sensory-motor feedback loop; and 2) locating, 
by means of imagery monitoring, a distant portion of the body-image, which is an 
attention/memory task. This sensation can be do to the increased contribution of the 
prefrontal cortex, in particular the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which is known 
to participate in motor imagery, not just in the sensory-motor integration and the 
attention/memory neurocognitive task with the anterior cingulate cortex, but also in a joint 
route with the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) during motor imagery [30,45–47]. The PPC, as 
a multisensory integrative cortex, plays an important role in the cognitive dynamics for 
spatial representation (limb-position) and movement intent, attention, working memory, 
and guidance of action [48,49]. As Jeannerod proposed “If motor imagery occurred with 
execution deliberately blocked or delayed, the representation would be protected from 
cancellation and would become accessible to conscious processing” [50]. Additionally, 
controls and amputees reported that they were consciously aware of their intact toes or, in 
the case of amputees, that they had the conscious perception of their phantom toes during 
the imaginary task.  The brain activations show similarities but also differences between 
amputee groups during the imaginary movement tasks of their intact and amputated toes. 
The differences were:  First, both amputee groups activate Basal Ganglia areas during the 
performance of the imaginary movement of the amputated toes. Second, the RLL amputee 
group shows more lateralized brain activation than the LLL amputee group. Third, during  
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the imaginary movement task, the RLL amputee group seems to require a greater attention 
control (ACC) as they performed the imaginary movement with their left intact toes than the 
LLL amputee group with their right intact toes. Additionally, the brain activations observed 
in the amputee group during the imagery movement task of the amputated toes involved 
the Basal Ganglia loop (RLL amputee group = Lentiform Nucleus, Medial Globus Pallidus, 
and Susbtantia Nigra; LLL amputee group = Thalamus and Substantia nigra). Thus, the 
imagined movement task in amputees demands different circuitry subsets for its 
accomplishment, namely: 1) the attention/memory/guidance loop, 2) the kinesthetic imagery 
loop, and 3) the conflict intention loop. The computational logistics for such activity can 
only be carried out by means of the intracortical and cortical-subcortical loops between 
Thalamus and Basal Ganglia nuclei. The kinesthetic representation of an action or a planned 
motor intent is the combined result of a widely distributed neuronal ensemble between 
DLPFC, inferior frontal cortex, and the SMA [31], together with the posterior parietal cortex 
(PPC) and the ACC for spatial awareness, attention and multisensory integration [49,51].  It 
is of mayor importance to notice here that the activation of the Basal Ganglia loop was not 
seen during imagery movement task of the intact toes in amputees or the healthy control 
group.  As far as the motor intent is concerned (Fig 1, B): a) in the control group, the 
performance of the task with the left (non-dominant) toes activated contralateral SMA (BA 
6) and ipsilateral inferior frontal cortex (BA 45), while the same task with the right 
(dominant) toes activated contralateral SMA (BA 6), STG (BA 22), and contralateral 
postcentral gyrus (BA 43). The minimal brain activity found in the controls’ kinesthetic 
representation correlates with the ensemble proposed [52,53]. b). In the RLL amputee group, 
in the coronal volumes (Fig 1, A), the performance of the imaginary motor intent with the 
left intact toes activated the bilateral ACC (BA 24), STG (BA 22), ipsilateral S1 (BA 3), and 
broad contralateral interhemispheric activity from SMA (BA 6) and contralateral thalamus. 
However, during the right imagined movement task of the amputated toes, there is bilateral 
activation at STG (BA 22/42), contralateral SMA (BA 6), M1 (BA 4), contralateral Lentiform 
Nucleus (medial globus pallidus), and Substantia Nigra. The RLL amputees’ brain activity 
for the kinesthetic representation differed between the performance of the intact imaginary 
movement and the amputated imaginary movement, since Lentiform Basal Ganglia activity 
is only present during the amputated toes imaginary movement. c) In the coronal-volumes 
of the LLL amputee group (Fig 1, C) during the performance of the imaginary movement 
task with the right intact toes, besides a bilateral MTG (BA 21/22) activation, there is clear 
contralateral Lentiform Nucleus-Putamen activation, together with SMA (BA 6) and M1 (BA 
4). However, during the imagery movement task with the amputated toes of the left leg, 
there is an ipsilateral thalamic and a Subgyral (BA 37) activation and a contralateral 
Substantia Nigra activation besides the large bilateral SMA (BA 6) and a bilateral MTG (BA 
21/22) activations observed during the intact toes imaginary movement. The LLL amputee 
brain activity for the kinesthetic representation differed slightly between the performance of 
the imaginary movement of intact versus amputated toes, since there is Basal Ganglia 
activity (Putamen) during imaginary movement of the intact toes, while during amputated 
toes imagined movement there is Thalamic and Substantia Nigra activity. This Basal 
Ganglia-Thalamo-Motor-Cortex loop subserves several cortex functions, such as memory 
tasks, orientation in space, and the ability to change behavioral set [43,54]. In the motor 
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imagery task, in particular in LL amputee research literature, the role of this ganglia-
thalamo-motor-cortex loop has never been mentioned. In this study we set out to establish 
its presence using the already mentioned task in the amputee and control groups. Thus, by 
comparing control and amputee groups, we found that there is minimal cortical activation 
difference between them, however, the difference occurs in the subcortical activation of the 
Basal Ganglia loop, since in both, the control group and during intact toes imaginary 
movement of amputated subjects there is no Basal Ganglia activation, while the activation of 
distinct Lenticular-Substantia-Nigra-Basal-Ganglia-Thalamic loop is clear in the amputee 
group performing imaginary movement of the amputated toes. We thus propose that the 
recruitment of these Basal Ganglia plays an important role in the process of conscious 
awareness of a missing limb reported by amputees.  
It is important to point out that we set out to find the involvement of the Basal Ganglia-
Thalamic-Motor-Cortex loop by means of this motor imagery task, as part of our hypothesis 
that the amputee can and does move the phantom limbs at will, this, do to his framework of 
body awareness as part of a self-related neurocognitive experience that can be as diverse as 
the perceiving of size, shape, posture, itch, touch, pressure, vibration, temperature, ‘electric’ 
sensations and prosthesis embodiment and has been well documented [20]. Similar to 
Ramachandran´s “null” hypothesis [17] we think that the interruption of the thalamic 
afferences/efferences may explain the persistence of an open loop functioning of the 
thalamocortical system and its consequent activation, which is a key factor to the cascade of 
conscious awareness and stability of the phantom phenomenon. This open loop functioning 
of the thalamocortical system is revealed in the present study by the increased blood oxygen 
level-dependent (BOLD) signal in the Basal Ganglia-Thalamic-Motor-Cortex loop pathway 
during imaginary movement of the amputated toes. Thus, supporting our hypothesis of the 
abnormal closed-loop functioning of the thalamocortical system as underlying the phantom 
phenomenon. 
6. Conclusion 
To conclude, we have put forward evidence of amputee patients’ indirect responses to PL 
experiences for an objective evaluation that suggests that the conscious awareness of a 
phantom limb emerges from both the reduction in afferent information and the higher-level 
brain reorganization of the cognitive representations of the amputee’s own body. We based 
our assumptions on the hypothesis that the thalamocortical loop is closed in healthy 
subjects, which enable them to distinguish an imaginary movement as actually being just 
imagined. This, do to the feedback received from intact peripheric (efferent/afferent) 
information pathways. The evidence shown here thus suggests that this abnormal open loop 
of the basal-ganglia-thalamocortical system underlies the conscious awareness of the 
phantom limb. The current approach further suggests that the basal ganglia within this 
basal-ganglia-thalamocortical system loop play a crucial and complex integration of afferent 
and efferent information processing. Furthermore, this integration creates the conscious 
awareness of the self and is in line with the internal model theory of motor control [15] 
where inverse and forward models of information processing interact continuously and 
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reciprocally. The inverse model component in the motor system providing the motor 
commands necessary to achieve a desired consequence of an action, specified by higher-
level goals and the forward model predicting the sensory consequences of each of these 
motor programs to be executed. Accordingly, whenever a motor program is issued, an 
efference copy is produced in parallel and an accurate prediction of the sensory 
consequences expected after the execution of the program, which in turn informs the 
inverse program of the actual state of the self and closing the loop for the next command. 
With this normally closed loop, the integration of the self is achieved and a normal body 
ownership and awareness is crated which is necessary to create the autobiographical 
experience of self. 
Glossary of terms 
Bottom-up: direction of information flow from the periphery (i.e. sensory cells or 
mechanoreceptors) to the central nervous system. 
Top-down: information flow from central nervous system toward peripheral effector cells 
(i.e. muscles). 
Efferent: Conveying away from the central nervous system 
Afferent: Conveying towards a central nervous system 
Phantom limb: is the sensation that an amputated or missing limb is still attached to the 
body  
Somatosensory system: sensory system composed of the receptors and processing centers to 
produce the sensory modalities such as touch, temperature, proprioception (body position), 
and nociception (pain). 
Proprioception: sensory modality that processes the body position 
Ipsilateral: same side of the body 
Contralateral: other side of the body 
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